中国特色阅读笔记 - 1922年夏

Reading Notes with Chinese Characteristics, in May, 1922

三十年前的月亮早已沉下去,三十年前的人也死了,然而三十年前的故事还没完──完不了。—— 張愛玲《金鎖記》

“The moon 30 years ago has set, and people 30 years ago has died, but the story 30 years ago hasn’t been over–it can’t be over” Eileen Chang, “The Golden Lock”


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“A Teacher in China Learns the Limits of Free Expression”

Author: Peter Hessler

The original link is here

Quotes and Comments

An infinitely smaller problem, but one that occupied infinitely more of my energy, was that transition sentence. Chinese education traditionally emphasizes imitation of models and rote literary phrases, and my Fuling students diligently incorporated the transition into their argumentative papers. It infected other writing, too: personal narratives, dialogues, literary essays. I might be reading a paper about “Hamlet,” when suddenly a voice would boom out, worse than Polonius’s: “But we should not give up eating for fear of choking.” The words are a direct translation of yinyefeishi, a Chinese literary phrase. Over and over, I tried to explain that this sounds terrible in English.

  • “The transition sentence” (过渡句) was something I had to use as a part of the essay writing in Chinese all the time and I suspect the students mentioned adapt it into English. However I’m curious how that counts as “transition sentence” because it looks like a comment at the end of the analysis, or maybe they use it as a new point… In general 成语 is not the best thing to use in an essay I’d say. I’m also wondering whether “因噎废食” (give up eating for fear of choking) is part of the 中庸之道 (staying in the middle)
    totally shifted the focus away but… I’m confused

For a returning teacher, this was a mystery: how had China experienced so much social, economic, and educational change while the politics remained stagnant, or even regressive? Nobody in freshman English was going to argue that it was a bad idea to remove Presidential term limits, or that the internment camps in Xinjiang should be abolished. Even if a student took a pro-government stance on a sensitive topic, he couldn’t fully engage with a counter-argument. And there was some risk for a teacher who played devil’s advocate while editing.

  • the answer, according to the latter part of the article, is that they are busy competing each other (involution/内卷) instead of exercising citizen’s rights to be against dictatorship…
  • Also I think the fact that this generation (well, my generation) grows up in the patriortic/nationalistic education makes it incredibly hard to see the “alternatives”.

I hadn’t thought it was possible to make “1984” any darker, but the students had succeeded.

  • My favourite quote from the article. This also leads me wondering how people can separate between the literary work and the real life they are experiencing, since the students do appear to be very competent in understanding the flaws of the “system”, but maybe just as he mentioned in the article, they recoganize the “drawbacks” but they also don’t support 因噎废食 (yin ye fei shi)

But my students at Sichuan University were old souls. They knew how things worked; they understood the system’s flaws and also its benefits. The environment they were entering was essentially the same one in which their parents had worked: for the first time, China has been both stable and prosperous for a period that’s longer than a university student’s memory.

  • In Chinese we have a very harsh term to comment on people of this kind (精致的利己主义者 delicate egoist, it’s harsh in a collectivism context).
  • It also explains why those students don’t find any problems with the ruling government – they are the beneficiaries and they don’t have any incentive to change the system.

I think my generation, born in the age of the Internet, is puzzled and somehow depressed by the conflict between Chinese beliefs and Western ones. Propaganda about liberty and reason prevails on the Internet while propaganda about patriotism and Communism prevails in the textbooks. Youngsters are mostly attracted by the former, but when passing exams and pursuing jobs, they should bear in mind the latter, and in practice in China, more often than not, the latter functions better.

  • Interesting perception by bringing the Western’s POV. For me I’m more confused by the contradictory stances people take at the same time. To better capture my feeling I would use the term 撕裂感 (the sense of tearing?).
  • Put into the context, I think it manifests how it’s just easier and more practical not to go against the current.

The Little Pink phenomenon, which seems to be amplified by social media, was not something I observed in the classroom. In my experience, the Chinese students of twenty-five years ago were much more nationalistic, and much less aware, than the students of today.

  • Very interesting observations and I should let all my internet friends read this paragraph. I think a part of it is also the different social-economic status his students were in compared to the students he taught in Sichuan University. Students here are just being very shrewd in choosing what works the best for them.

It impressed me as another way in which the system functioned effectively: in the hybrid arrangement, the decision to get rid of the American teacher could be blamed on the American institution.

  • How did he confirm this though. Also there’s not a lot of details about it. I guess it is always hard…

When teaching Orwell, I often thought about why such books aren’t considered a threat to the Party. In the novels of the Dystopian Trilogy, futuristic societies distract and control individuals by various methods: the continuous war and rewritten history of “1984,” the sex and soma drugs of “Brave New World,” the surgical removal of human imagination in “We.” But none of these books anticipates how useful competition can be in sustaining a long-term authoritarian state. In China, nationalistic propaganda might be effective for children and other people at a lower level, but there’s a tacit understanding that it won’t work as well for the highly educated. As long as these individuals have opportunities to advance and improve their lives, they are less likely to oppose authority. And the system doesn’t need to be hermetically sealed in the manner of “1984.” The vast majority of Chinese students who go abroad choose to return—for them, it’s as simple as yinyefeishi. If they were truly afraid of choking, they would remain in the United States.

  • The unexpected effect of involution.

And there’s a point at which competition becomes a highly effective distraction. For most of my students, the greatest worry didn’t seem to be classroom security cameras or other instruments of state control—it was the thought of all those talented young people around them.

Holiday means others went out to play and I am studying, which is the time that I have the highest relative efficiency. I could learn more than others and I will get a higher GPA. Holiday is the best time that I can go surpass my classmates in study.

The week before I left the university, I met off campus with the publication’s staff. There were about twenty students, almost all of them female. That was another aspect of university life that wasn’t quite Orwellian. From “1984”: “It was always the women, and above all the young ones, who were the most bigoted adherents of the Party, the swallowers of slogans, the amateur spies and nosers-out of unorthodoxy.” In my experience, female students seemed less nationalistic than the men, and I suspected they were less likely to jubao a professor.

Why Xinjiang is an internal settler colony

by Darren Byler, Sept.1, 2021

The original link is here

Quotes and Comments

  • Context

    These new trees, planted in the 1990s and 2000s, were the “Open Up the Northwest” (西北大开发 xīběi dà kāifā) and “Open Up the West” trees (西部大开发 xībù dà kāifā). The people I interviewed also called them “investment” (Uy: kapital) trees. In many cases, the work brigades, which are still the most common form of rural government in Xinjiang, sold the rights to these young trees to villagers. At a certain point, decades from now, they will be permitted to cut down the trees and enjoy the profits of their lumber.

    In the early 2000s, the Hú Jǐntāo 胡锦涛 administration took the regional project “Open Up the Northwest” to a new level, rebranding it as “Open Up the West.”

    The “Open Up the Northwest” project had resulted in rapid and sustained economic growth of over 10 percent per year since 1992, so state authorities were eager to take the development projects further, opening new markets and new sites for industrial production. By the early 2000s, the Uyghur homeland had become the country’s fourth largest oil-producing area, with a capacity of 20 million tons per year.

    • I (for whatever reason that is) never had a second thought about the “Open up the West” policies. Very important context to add I’d say.
  • Cotton:

    At the same time, in June 1992 Chinese leaders announced a new policy position that would turn the Uyghur homeland into a center of trade, capitalist infrastructure, and agricultural development capable of further serving the needs of the national economy. One of the main emphases in the new proposal was the need to establish Xinjiang as one of China’s primary cotton-producing regions.

    By 2020, 85 percent of Chinese cotton was produced in the Uyghur region.

    Using threats of land seizures and detention — a type of legalized theft or expropriation — local authorities often forced farmers to convert their existing multi-crop farms to cotton in order to meet buyer-imposed quotas. In the same manner, in their capacity as brokers with state enterprise buyers, local officials forced farmers to sell their cotton only to these buyers. These corporations in turn sold the cotton at full market price to factories in Eastern China.

  • Colony

    For Tohti, the most important factors associated with Uyghur dispossession were “blatant ethnic discrimination in hiring, a rural labor surplus, overconcentration of economic resources in Han Chinese-dominated urban areas, ‘stability maintenance policies’ that restrict population mobility and exacerbate rural unemployment, and severe underinvestment in basic education.” Millward argues that “what Tohti described — without using the word — is a colonial system of settlement and extraction in Xinjiang.”

    • I do want to add here why we wouldn’t find analyzing Chinese investment in Africa from the colonialism pov productive–the details do matter.

    This process has been fostered by state capital, which subsidized the development of natural resource and industrial agriculture sectors by injecting billions of yuan into the region. As the sociologist Ching Kwan Lee has shown, Chinese state capital often acts as a subsidy in securing long-term economic interests even if they are not immediately profitable. By investing in the Han settlement of Xinjiang, putting settlers to work in natural resource extraction and overseer positions on industrial farming plantations, and fostering a service sector that supported this development, the state was assured of a permanent reserve of domestic energy and raw materials essential to economic growth.

    • So basically extracting the region’s resources without benefiting the residents at all…

    In 2014, Uyghur protests against these obvious forms of west-east wealth transfer were officially outlawed as one of 75 signs of religious extremism or violent terrorism.

    In Xinjiang, dispossession is not just about a lack of compensation, it is about a process of illegalizing traditions and turning sacred land into property.

    These three elements — material dispossession, institutional domination, and settler occupation — are what established Xinjiang as a contemporary settler colony that was internal to the Chinese state.

Related Materials Mentioned in the Article

郑杭生:民族团结与和谐社会建设——一种社会学的解读

The link to the article is here. It was written in 2010, so after the 7.5 event in 2009. I think it is a good reference to the central gov’s attitude towards “民族大团结” as a narrative at that time, even though it does have a long history. Basically, the “multicultrualism” with Chinese characteristics means that we all fight and build the “socialism” together.

就中国的情况说,“民族团结”,就是把我国56个不同民族联合起来,使之成为彼此具有相互依存的良性互动关系、并形成更大民族共同体–中华民族的过程和状态。

广泛的民族认同

  • 第一个层次,即高一级层次的民族认同,就是对中华民族的认同
  • 第二个层次,即基层的民族认同,就是对56个民族各自社会身份和社会角色的认同
  • 多元一体格局中,56个民族是基层,中华民族是高层
  • 在当代中国,民族认同并不是单纯民族认同的问题,而是与祖国认同、中华文化认同、中国特色社会主义道路认同,紧密联系在一起的。

我们要建立的社会主义民族关系,是“平等、团结、互助、和谐”的新型民族关系

  • 和谐社会的建设,包含有双重的任务、解决两个方面的问题,第一,就是如何在一个市场经济的陌生人世界里构筑人际关系和谐、互助合作的新的社会共同体,这个社会共同体,在宏观上叫做和谐社会,在微观上叫做和谐社区
  • 第二,就是如何在价值观开放多元的环境中构建认同度高、归属感强的意义共同性,这种意义共同性,在宏观上叫做社会归属感,在微观上叫做社区归属感,对各个民族来说就是民族归属感

在实际的社会生活中,民族团结还表现为:努力消除一切不利于民族团结的因素,既反对大民族主义,主要是大汉族主义,也反对地方民族主义,坚定不移地维护民族团结。

第二,民族团结本身就是社会和谐不可或缺的重要内容

国际敌对势力对我国实行西化和分化的政治图谋一刻也没有放松,与国内民族分裂势力相互勾结,处心积虑地利用所谓“民族”、“宗教”、“人权”等问题,加紧对我进行渗透、分裂、破坏和颠覆活动。民族问题的特点是,它涉及国家的核心利益,一出现就不是小问题。

  • For me I think most words use a different definition here compared to their western origins.

第三,民族团结对社会和谐的重要性越来越突出

对此,我们必须站在国家统一、民族团结这一最高利益、核心利益的高度,采取特殊政策措施,下大力气解决:在发展战略和总体布局中,把加快少数民族和民族聚居地区发展,摆到更加突出、更加重要、更加紧迫的位置上来。既要投入更多的资金,又要给予更优惠的政策;既要帮助他们把经济搞上去,又要帮助他们发展各项社会事业;既要继续发挥中央政府的作用,又要坚持抓好各地的对口支持工作。切实加大感情投入、政策投入、人才投入、资金投入和科技投入。充分调动民族聚居地区内外两个积极性,使民族聚居地区的发展实现新的跨越。

New Regulations on Algorithms

One month after the implementation of new regulations on algorithms, how many personalized recommendation services still intrude on personal information?

Link to translation is here, and the original article is here. I found it on ChinaAI Newsletter

Since the implementation of the regulations, here’s what some companies have done:

  • WeChat, Meituan, Bilibili, Douyin, Taobao, Weibo, and Toutiao have added buttons for users to turn off personalized recommendation functions.
  • Some apps now let users view the specific personal info collected by the app as well as the frequency of collection. A few provide an option for users to clear previous activities on the app with one click.
  • The regulations also require companies to increase transparency about how their recommendation algorithms work. Meituan, one of the companies called out by that People exposé on food deliveries, now provides more information about how they calculate “estimated arrival time” for deliveries and builds in more time for delivery workers.

黨旗下的天秤:中國「法治」的政治邏輯|端傳媒 Initium Media

The origin source is here[https://theinitium.com/article/20210906-opinion-china-law-construction/invite_token/fDHBwKMaye/] (my friend generously shared it with me), in traditional Chinese

《網絡安全法》《個人信息保護法》等立法的主要目的明顯仍然是加強國家權力、加強對公民的監控,但確實也有試圖平息公眾對網絡安全的擔憂及對大型互聯網企業拿著用戶數據為所欲為的不滿的目的——比如《個人信息保護法》就專門針對「大數據殺熟」等性質惡劣的商業手段進行了限制。

耶魯大學張泰蘇教授和哥倫比亞大學金斯堡(T. Ginsburg)教授在最近的一篇論文中指出,「習近平領導下的中國共產黨確實進行了前所未有的集權,但它以高度法律化的方式做到了這一點,賦予法院對抗其他國家機關和黨組織的權力、堅持法律專業精神」

甚至遭到西方國家和香港民主派人士一致批評的《香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》(香港國安法),其實也正說明中共對法律工具的濃厚興趣。

國際上,西方國家雖然已經不再對中國民主化抱有幻想,但仍然期望至少中國的司法改革特別是對政府和司法機關法律素養的提高能帶來的營商環境的改善——比如中國知識產權法的進步特別是京滬穗三地知識產權法院的運作,就得到了國際法律服務界的讚許。

這種態度與中共十年前對法治的態度可謂截然相反。; 「把法律當作擋箭牌」

「法治」原本是西方社會的舶來品,以司法獨立為基礎、節制政治權力、保護個人的權利與自由,其本質是自由主義的,所以中共在加以採用時,自然需要嚴加提防。

創建中國特色「法治」話語的終極難題,在於如何處理「黨的領導」與「法治」之間的關係。

所以早在習近平主政之前,中共就反覆強調過反對司法獨立的西方法治思想。2009年3月,時任全國人大常委會委員長的吳邦國發表了堅決抵制「三權分立」的談話,當時的最高人民法院副院長沈德詠也表明,「在中國,人民法院必須堅持在黨的領導下,在人大監督下,堅持中國特色社會主義司法制度,依法獨立公正行使審判權,絕不能簡單套用、照搬西方那一套,絕不能搞三權分立式的司法獨立。」

自由派這種「承認黨的抽象領導地位,但在日常政治中要求『法大於黨』」的觀點,與中共的法治論述是無法兼容的,因為中共所強調的是堅持黨對「一切工作」的領導。「黨大還是法大」的問題,在更深入的理論層面上繼續懸而未決。

陳端洪認為,中共中央是「作為主權者的中國人民」的終極代表,而憲法僅僅是「以『全國各族人民』的口吻宣告了、衛護了共產黨的領導這個原則而已」,「像任何代表制一樣,在中國,主權者人民也不能親自出場,而需經由代表行使主權」,所以,「中國共產黨是中國人民的代表,這是一個基本的政治事實,也是根本的憲法原則」,中共中央是「人民制憲權的常在的代表機構」,也是「主權意義的制憲權代表」。

所以,無論是對內還是對外,中共的「法治」建設,為了達到其效果,都不可能脫離通行的法治定義而另起爐灶。中共當然一方面希望用通行的法治理念的金字招牌來收攬人心、吸引資本、管控下級黨員官僚,同時另一方面拒絕接納通行的法治理念的核心價值、亦拒絕把黨完全置於憲法和法律之下。但如果「中國特色」的「法治」完全變成中共的自說自話、與通行的法治明顯毫無關係,自然也就無法沾到「法治」的光、達不到「法治」建設的功能性目的了。

黄昏

《政治的人生》

作者:王沪宁

政治稳定

中文大概已经死了

作者:王左中右 原文链接 archive

“中文好像越来越年轻。”

  1. 中文越来越低幼。

    • 好像什么事都是过家家。

    • 这么多年,我们为严将军头,为嵇侍中血。为张睢阳齿,为颜常山舌,语言和思想原本很有力量,原本是那样的铁骨铮铮,荡气回肠

  2. 中文越来越敏感。

    • “▢”这个符号虽然是为了屏蔽而诞生的,但它十分像另一个字——口。这就导致了很多原本R-18的内容,开始走向了十八禁的方向。 (我好喜欢这句话,虽然没什么营养)

    • 很多像“杀”这样词,本身并没有什么敏感,但越来越不让乱说,结果反倒是越来越乱说。

  3. 中文越来越失去创造力了。

    • 更可怕的是无所不在又烂俗的谐音梗,以各种刁钻的角度轰炸你的信息流。

    • 所以我们生活的时代:歌词越来越口水化,文学越来越网络化,诗歌越来越浅显化,大众词汇越来越庸俗化…

  4. 中文的废话越来越多了。

    • 文字本质上就是智力的剩余,废话本质上就是思想的懒惰。

Brief Comment:

  • 我觉得其实如果标题还有他的主语换一下就好很多:不是中文已经死了,是墙内社交媒体上的简体中文已经死了
  • 年轻人是谁教出来的lol
  • 房间里的大象…lol
  • 话说回来也是个逃避审查的好方法👌
  • 但是确实启发我,可以去做一些溯源

延伸阅读:

郑伟:记录与表述:中国大陆一九九○年代以来的独立纪录片

作者:郑伟 原文链接

中国大陆独立纪录片的出现,与二十世纪八九十年代之交国内社会转型时期的文化思潮有很大关系。那时,随着社会的开放与进步,一种兼容并包的思想氛围相对形成。在先锋艺术领域“独立和自由精神”的倡引下,许多怀有艺术理想的人自愿脱离公职,专注于自己的创作,成为生活在社会边缘的“自由艺术家”或文化“盲流”。独立纪录片产生的另一个重要原因甚至是直接动因,是对实现个人化的影像写作和表述的一种渴望。这是由早期独立纪录片的作者的特殊身份决定的,他们多少都曾与电视台有过某种工作或合作关系,但是在为电视台制作(纪录片)节目的过程中,他们感到了相当程度的束缚与制约。于是,独立创作纪录片成为他们实现艺术理想的最好选择。

独立纪录片主要具有两个特点:一是在资金方面,不依托于体制,作者在筹措、运作拍摄资金方面有着相当的责任和权力,并能够有效控制作品的销售及发行渠道;二是在创作方面,没有商业化和播出的压力,作者的创作理念不受外部人为因素的制约。概括来说,独立纪录片的“独立”,不单是一种独立的行为和姿态,更是一种独立的立场和精神。

独立纪录片的作者往往兼具导演和制片人双重的身份,一般不属于体制内。但独立纪录片与体制内的电视纪录片在一定程度上还是存有某种互动与渗透,两者共同构建了中国纪录片的完整版图。

What prompts me to read the article: Documentary We Graduate

《广电报》:说说您的第一部作品吧。 王光利:我记得那时候学校旁边是外国语大学,两所学校之间经常进行交流,他们学校有许多国外的学生,带来了许多优秀的片子。于是在1988年,我和贾樟柯他们创立了大学生电影节。这些做法引来了第三代导演的不屑,觉得我们什么都不懂还玩电影。好吧,那我们就无知者无畏一次吧,刚好那时协会布置了作业,让我们拍同学们的生活,最后我就拍出了《毕业了》这部作品,花费少,仅仅是表达我的内心世界。这部作品没过多久就火了,直到现在还经常能收到这部作品带给我的一些费用。有了这次毕业作品的初试,我就想真正拍一部电影,刚开始不知道拍什么,想拍纪录片但又不想太普通,就想拍有挑战性的,拍出的片子也起了一个很直接的名字,就叫《处女作》。最后就由圈内人带领,走地下电影的路线。现在回过头想想,很佩服那时的我,很有勇气,告诉你一件事,其实我拍《处女作》第一天才知道胶片长什么样。

一些亲历者观后感:

我畢業了
王丹
說實話,“畢業”這個詞真沒有給我留下什麽好的記憶。
1989年以後,大陸有一部地下紀錄片,名字就叫《我畢業了》,是記述“天安門一代”大學生──87、88級──畢業時的悲苦心境與迷茫。他們有同學死在長安街上,自己又感同身受地體驗政治肅殺,那種深切的壓抑使畢業成了心靈的葬禮。他們不想畢業,不想因為自己的離去使孤魂更加孤苦,使理想主義的過去徹底化為灰燼。記得影片中最打動人的是黃金剛(中國青年政治學院學生)的悠長而憂傷的歌聲:“親愛的人,再見再見……”。只有我們這些經歷過年輕的死亡的人才可以體會到,這不是對生者、而是對死者的告別。
1994年我在北京的時候,招待各方面的朋友看這部片子。每一次都見到有朋友大哭著從我放電視機的房間裏出來。我總是遞過去紙巾,而自己,卻從來不敢與他們一起再看一遍。那時,我從來沒有畢業過,但“畢業”這個詞卻在我心中代表了悲傷,代表了淚水,代表了那麽多人永遠斬不斷的記憶。
現在我真的畢業了,從哈佛大學東亞地區研究畢業。貨真價實的畢業,但並沒有貨真價實的畢業生的快樂。有些沈重是命中註定的。當你只能承擔時,回避毫無意義。我對於畢業的記憶就是如此。
在畢業典禮那天,周圍的美國同學尖叫、歡笑,但我的內心如一片秋天景象,孤寂而荒涼。一瞬間,我的耳邊響起的是重付的歌聲:“親愛的人,再見再見……” 親愛的人,我的生命是幸存的,但我的悲傷與記憶,永遠陪著你們。 (2001年6月7日)

from his facebook page

影单:禁片目录

《死亡与少女》

作者:耶利内克

P11 我似乎必须不断地爬上去,然后再跌下来,从女人手里跌下来。这种例外还不错,可死亡不是这样的例外。死神总是作为男人降临,然后又不像男人了。他潜伏在那里等我们,令人讨厌地冒出来,总是在我们——就拿我当作例子吧——快成功的当儿来捣乱,阻止我们成功,迫使我们出局,连一句安慰话也没有。

P12 别再把自己当成避难所。这样就不会错过真理了。

P20 民众应该缓和自己的行为,以达到自己的目的。至少遇见深层次问题时不要躁动不安。遇见无法解释的事情,就应该让它在解释的地基上安息,直到地下窜出的花朵踢它的屁股。到时候,就该老家它起身为我们启蒙,让我们能对存在的事物有个概念。

P25 下一个问题:人醒后是什么?您会吻谁?我以前从未见过您。我怎么知道您原来是谁?我可是丧失了与生命的练习。虽然存在无与伦比,可人能干什么?人根本就没有比较的可能。您就这么来了,说您是王子。好吧,您也许就是王子,因为眼下我像是醒着,这只有您办得到,F太太当初就告诉过我了。

但我的生存方式也许只有等待,等待被亲吻的那一天。等待就是要换一种活法?

Warten als win auf ein Anders Sein aus sein.

P28 但我们在这里自然不想把时间看作永恒的敌人,至多是女性美的敌人,因为我作为上帝可以让您相信永生不是我们的目的,它的小妹妹——价值观永恒也不是。

本剧工作人员:兰迪·塔拉波雷利、伊丽莎白·维特、罗兰·巴特等

P96 自然我是最漂亮的。我记不需要后母也不需要镜子就知道这一点。

什么?我不漂亮?

不,你也漂亮,但你是另外一种漂亮。我漂亮是因为人必须漂亮。你自以为漂亮,但你没那么漂亮。也是一种认知,但它没有任何客体可指涉因为你根本就不在。你在墙里,完了。或在墙前,死了。就像这位世界知名登山队员的兄弟。或者从下边来得及逃生。但刚才说了,不是女英雄。你肯定会给我们很详细描述的。

你说男人坏话好灭掉他,后来你才发现他站在透明墙后边,这面墙你擦了好几个小时,擦得这么干净,只为了抓他时看清楚些,这个男人,你亲爱的爸爸,可你不能抓他。他抓不到。反正不是你抓的。真不可思议。

我只有这一个炉盘,可我总得开着它。它都发烫了,可我并没感觉无聊。正是为了这个我才结婚的。现在太晚了。现在我有这个漂亮的烤箱,可以不慌不忙地把头放进去,把它烤熟。不要忘记事先上好厨房里的种!我的孩子们现在可以安心待在隔壁房间里了,我们眼下有了新的炉灶,不止一个炉盘。

P114 您可是看见了,女士们,先生们。俄底修斯,把脚放在挖沟挖出的土堆上,左胳膊放在大腿上,他用来抵挡影子的剑右手举着,在倾听令人敬仰的人物说话,他是弯着腰的睁眼瞎。您可是看见了,女士们,先生们。白发表明他上了年纪,左手的拐杖表明他是瞎子。您可是看见了,女士们,先生们。


想起lady Lazarus里的 Gentlemen, ladies

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/49000/lady-lazarus

然后俄底修斯断过腿(?)不得不继续想起Sylvia的父亲…

You do not do, you do not do
Any more, black shoe In which I have lived like a foot

最后的revenge或许也能和诗篇结尾呼应 There’s a stake in your fat black heart
And the villagers never liked you. They are dancing and stamping on you.
They always knew it was you. Daddy, daddy, you bastard, I’m through.

但我真的需要了解另外一位narrator的背景才能下结论


如前所受,真实的东西不只是人们看见的东西,真实也包括人们所说与所见相符。可在这个女人身上每个人看到的东西可能都不同,有关她的传闻也是不一而足,每个传闻对你或对他都是真的,虽然这些传闻大都矛盾重重。就是说每个传闻对每个人来说都对,虽然事情本身不是那么回事儿。

我们只能容忍与我们一致的事实。于是我们成了王妃,正像主教在查尔斯和戴安娜王妃的婚礼上所说(据称这一天我们大家都可以是王子和公主,虽然对其他人不是,但至少彼此认为是),因为我们得到了这个王妃的照片作为样板,但这个样板总是把我们遮盖,我们举起来看,想仔细研究一下我们到底想成为谁,可举得越高越模糊。当然最好别死。毕竟有好多事儿等着我们去做。


《「出逃」女人苏敏,驾驶她的车》

在直播中,她会说些让女人们大呼过瘾的话:「男人是靠不住的。」她鼓励女人们大胆做自己。更多的时候,她展现的不过是一个旅行达人的穷游生活。纽约时报把她称为「中国女权主义偶像」。她并不那么看。「我就是做了我自己想做的事儿而已,给咱们同龄的姐妹们活成了她们想要的样子。」她说。她也否认离家出走与勇气的关联,只是想着「离开那个地方会很开心」。

一百年来,「出走」一直是中国女性的重要意象,诸多女性加入其中,结局各异。苏敏也进入了「出走」的行列,但她从来不想拔高什么。

「我们不想过多地去渲染。因为女权在中国某些人的眼中,它不是一个好形象,这是我的理解。」苏敏的女婿刘伟伟对我说,「但是我们毕竟代替不了她,她具体什么想法,可能完全不一样。」他销售出身,现在是苏敏的经纪人。

// 旁观者视角

「我不知道,它就是发生了。真的没那么大的逻辑感。」她说,「我最烦的就是你要问我的感想,因为我真的没有想法,我真的没有想法,任何事情都是顺其自然去做了,去说了,去实现了。没有说是因为有什么想法才去做这个事情。」

「我真的没有任何想法……你一问我有什么想法、有什么思想的时候我就特别激动。我不想听,我真的没有想法……」她越说越愤怒。片中不到一分钟的时间,她17次提到这个词。想法。

「作为一个被拍摄者,天然的权利上是不平等的。她是被你审视的,她在你面前是暴露的。虽然这是双方达成一致的拍摄,但是这个叙事的权利依然是掌握在你手里的。」吴明敏对我说,「不管怎么说,她是一个有过创伤经历的人。在这点上,她是一个弱者。」

当时公公婆婆都住在杜晓阳家里帮忙照顾双胞胎,苏敏依然三天两头往女儿家跑。有天回到自己家,丈夫质问她,你去干什么,是不是有想法?这是一句外人听起来不明所以的话,但经常被丈夫拿来质问她。「我爸说话那个语气,形成一种气压。这是一个长期的精神压迫。」杜晓阳说。「这是他的一个武器,一个鞭子。」刘伟伟说。

// 我记得在看NPD的科普视频的时候有提到类似的technique
// 非常 非常典型的 trauma response
// 很喜欢这篇文章里纪录片编导以及媒体的视角(或者说反思?)

苏敏不再是一个独行者,她是一个群体中的一员。在刻板印象里,这个群体常常沦为网络段子和动图里的嘲讽对象。你也许可以喊她们「大妈」或者「阿姨」。她们是不再年轻的女人。她们是平凡的妻子和母亲。她们有倾听与表达的需求,但无论是公共舆论、文学或是影视剧中,她们得到的机会太少了。

至少这段旅程里,她们为自己而活,她们不是谁的妻子或者谁的母亲。她们穿漂漂亮亮的衣服,品尝美食,大量地拍照。她们想被人看到,每个人都有抖音。她们聊天,「乱七八糟的,路上的所见所闻,吃到的美食,或者是想念哪个地方的景」。当然还有讲笑话。

// 中年女性的处境

旅伴们形成一种默契,就是不打听家事。「背包」是所有人里最早与苏敏见面的那一个,她当时只是简单介绍说她的情况是离婚、单身。那你孩子多大了,苏敏问。20多岁了,我一个人在江西,「背包」说。提问到这里就结束了。

「又不是户口调查,问那么多干嘛啊。」苏敏对我说。每个人都有不愿意说的秘密。既然出来了,就把过往抛在脑后。

但更多关于她出游(用「出逃」这个词其实并不准确)的意义阐释,是由大众和媒体替她完成的。对她而言,这个行为本身的动机非常简单。任何思辨的讨论,与她要非常小心地展开,否则会揭开她的伤疤。她不是一个思想者,她是一个行动者。她解决困境的方法不是靠回答,而是靠行动。她处在流动的河水之中,「我感觉一路都在成长」。对于女性生命如何舒展,她提供的是一种路径,一种想象力,而不是终极答案。

任何事情都有好的一面和坏的一面。今天这一路比昨天好看。房车是现在的家。引擎嗡嗡作响。苏敏继续飞驰。

//感觉她的人生哲学(任何事情都有好的一面和坏的一面)简直是…self-therapy

女权主义者自述:中国米兔展的海外站,我与民族主义留学生交手几个回合

留学生身在海外,并不意味着TA们能接触到更有批判性的信息。针对海外留学生的中文资讯平台积极地采用民族主义叙事,强化海外留学生群体的爱国热情。这些媒体对本地的社会运动通常采取猎奇和反感的立场,阻碍留学生理解和参与社会运动。

英国高校中的去殖民运动也刚刚开始,欧洲中心主义依然严重。留学生不仅在课堂上很难接触到关于中国的进步主义思想,在社团中也很难获得这样的机会。像中国学联这样和大使馆保持密切联系的保守主义社团,不仅不可能提供反思民族主义的空间,而且还在复制国内学联中广泛存在的压迫和剥削,给参与的学生带来许多伤害。

英国的大学对此没有任何作为。为了维系和中国大使馆的良好关系,同时维护中国留学生的生源,英国大学不会对中国学联存在的问题有所干涉。不仅是中国学联,其它学生社团中也广泛存在暴力和压迫,尤其是种族主义和性别主义的问题,英国高校在应对这些问题时非常无力。学生遇到问题想要去投诉的时候,才知道英国高校的投诉系统不仅十分复杂,而且很难及时回应学生的诉求。

// …合理怀疑美国高校也是这样(damn)说好的China Task Force呢怎么不用来针对CSSA (喂)是觉得本科生没啥危害嘛,可是明明这帮人更像间谍一点啊(喂)

// 想起CSA(Chinese Students and Activists (CSA) Network) 最近的workshop说想要改变对留学生的stereotype,不想被CSSA代表(damn)

//查到1989年成立了一个中国留学生组织叫中国留美学生学者联合会,(IFCSS)非常有趣…但总感到无奈

在此历史关头,我们四万中国留美学生和学者受到良知和正义的召唤,走到一起来,庄严宣告中国留美学生学者联合会的成立。我们强烈遣责中国现政权对和平民众的血腥镇压。我们对死难同胞表示沉痛的悼念;对死者和受害者的亲属表示深切的同情。人民的血不会白流,镇压人民的元凶必将受到历史和人民的最后审判。这一天定会来到!

原谅我但第一个注意到的是这个语言风格……(sigh)

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